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Attempts to alleviate farmers' financial stress through concessionary 
loans have become more common in the U.S. during the 1980s. Previously, the 
Farmers' Home Administration was the main provider of such loans, but lately 
State governments have joined these efforts. By early 1987 twenty-three states 
had initiated emergency programs for farm finance, with total funding of about 
$1.7 billion (Popovich). These state initiatives include interest rate buy-
downs, interest rate deferrals, interest forgiveness, farm grants, state loan 
guarantees, direct loans from state funds, state secondary markets for farm 
loans, and state deposits with agricultural lenders linked to concessionary 
loans. 
In terms of number of states involved and volume of funds committed, the 
linked-deposit programs (LOPs) were the most important of these efforts. 
Typically, a farmer requests a linked-deposit loan through his or her financial 
institution. The lender forwards the application to the state for review. 
Funds from state investment portfolios or appropriations are then used to 
purchase certificates of deposits (COs) or debentures in the lending 
institution. These deposits receive a below-market rate of interest. The 
lending institution, in turn, makes the loan to the farmer in the amount of the 
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the references. The authors appreciate the assistance and support of the 
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deposit at a concessionary interest rate. By late 19&6 nine states had 
authorized LDPs: Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, 
Ohio, and South Dakota. Seven states aade LDP aoney available to farmers in 
1986 amounting to about $740 aillion; the Maine and South Dakota prograas were 
authorized but not yet i•pleaented. Approximately 16,000 far•ers received 
loans under LDP in 1986. 
While LDPs only provided a saall part of the total credit used by u.s. 
faraers--less than one percent of the non-real estate tara lending in 1986--and 
cover an even smaller percentage of all U. S. farmers, their results provide 
useful insights into the strengths and weaknesses of concessionary credit 
programs. In the following we provide information on the operations of Ohio's 
LDP. We assess the prograa through four criteria: (1) The overall cost of the 
program. (2) The extent to which LDP subsidies reached farmers with financial 
stress. (3) The size of these subsidies coapared to LDP borrowers• financial 
needs. And, (4) the extent to which LDP provided additional funds for far•ers. 
We conclude with a few coaaents about the liaitations of LDPs and also suggest 
several alternatives for assisting financially stressed faraers. 
Background on LDP in Ohio 
Ohio was one of the first states to begin an LDP and its program is among 
the three largest LDP efforts, only Illinois and Michigan are larger. Ohio's 
LDP, established in April, 1985, covered a four year period, and authorized the 
use of up to $100 •illion. The expressed oeJective of the program was, " ..• to 
provide a statewide availability of lower cost funds for lending to persons 
engaged in agriculture that will .•. contribute to the econoaic revitalization of 
this state." (House Bill No. 344, The 116tb General Asseably). Although the 
General Assembly was not very explicit in its intent to help financially 
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stressed farmers, the public perceived the target group to be financially 
stressed farmers. 
Borrowers requested LDP loans through their regular lenders and a short 
application form was sent by the lender to the State Treasurer's Office. In 
the case of commercial banks and savings and loan associations (S&Ls), if the 
application was approved, the state purchased a certificate of deposit for the 
amount of the loan request. The state purchased a single debenture in the Farm 
Credit System to allow Production Credit Associations (PCAs) in Ohio to 
participate. The state accepted a below-market rate of interest on these 
instruments. The lending institution would then reduce the interest rate 
charged to the farmer by three percent for loans taken out for a two-year term 
and by four percent for loans under a year. The rate paid on the state's 
deposit was reduced by the same percentages. 
The lender assumed all risk on LOP loans and applied usual lending 
standards to identify borrowers. A cap of $100,000 was placed on any single 
loan. The $100 million, excluding the loans committed for two years, could be 
rolled over three times during the length of the program. The Treasurer's 
Office had the option to distribute all, or part of the $100 million in any 
year; the entire $100 million was placed in both 1985 and 1986. 
The General Assembly established three requirements for a farmer to 
participate in the program: the operator must be headquartered in Ohio. the 
operation must be exclusively in Ohio, and, the operation must be organized for 
profit (116th General Assembly Conference Committee Report on H.B. No. 344, 
p.1). The Treasurer's Office asked for verification that the borrower met 
these eligibility requirements and also asked for some financial information 
about the borrower: the amount of interest paid as a percentage of operating 
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expenses for 1982, 1983, and 1984, and the current debt-to-equity ratio of the 
operation. 
We use this financial information on LDP in Ohio for the year 1985 in our 
analysis, along with additional inforaation collected froa participating LDP 
lenders in central Ohio, and some preliminary inforaation froa the 1986 cycle 
of the prograa. 
LDP Operations in 1985-86 
In 1985 the state received 1,770 LDP applications, and 1,575 of these 
were approved. In 1986 the state received 2,791 applications and 1,401 were 
approved. The average LDP loan was $63,000 in 1985 and $66,000 in 1986. 
Coaaercial banks processed about 798 of the 1985 loans while PCAs extended the 
remaining 777 loans. The Treasurer's office attempted to get a broad 
geographical dispersion of loans, and in 1985, 82 of the 88 counties in Ohio 
had at least one farmer receiving funds. In 1986, 85 counties had 
participants. 
In 1985, just over 50 percent of the funds were distributed through 
eighty-two comaercial banks and savings and loan associations (S&Ls). The 
remainder was distributed through ten PCAs that were eager to participate 
because they were generally charging higher interest rates than co .. ercial 
banks and were, thus, losing some of their best clients to other lenders. 
The application deadline for the first cycle of LDP was June 21, 1985, 
long after aost farm-lending decisions had been aade for the year. In early 
1985 the General Assembly was preoccupied with the failure of Home State 
savings and was not able to consider the linked-deposit bill earlier. In 1986 
and 1987 the deadline for LDP applications was in April. 
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Program Costs 
The Ohio r.DP appeared be a "free lunch" to some people, since the funds 
came from the state's investment portfolio and there was no budget 
appropriation. However, the State lost future revenue by accepting a lower 
rate of return on the CDs and debentures purchased for LDP than it would 
otherwise have realized. In the 1985 cycle of LDP approximately $6.9 million 
was lent for two years at a 3 percent below-market rate of interest. This 
represents about $207,000 ($6.9 million x .03) in interest income foregone by 
the state in 1985 and, assuming the amount of long-term loans remains the same 
for each cycle, about $828,000 over the length of the program ($207,000 x 4). 
The remaining loans, $93.1 million, were short-term loans at a 4 percent 
below-market rate of interest. The foregone interest, in this case, depends on 
how much time elapsed before borrower repayment and consequently, the length of 
time the state's investments received below-market rates. The Farm Credit 
System's debenture had an April 1986 maturity date, and the majority of two-
year loans were made through commercial banks and S&Ls. We therefore assume 
that the $50 million distributed through PCAs was committed for eleven months, 
that is, June 1985 through April 1986. If it is assumed that the remaining 
$43.1 million was committed for nine months, the yearly cost to the state of 
the short-term loans would be approximately $3.2 million [($50 million x .04 x 
11/12) + ($43.1 million x .04 x 9/12)]. On the other hand, if the $43.1 
million was committed for eleven months, the yearly cost of the short-term 
loans would be approximately $3.5 million (($50 million x .04 x 11/12) + ($43.1 
million x .04 x 11/12)]. 
The total opportunity cost of the 1985 linked-deposit program, in terms of 
state revenues foregone, was between $3.5 and $3.7 million--about $2,100 for 
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each of the 1,575 loans made in 1985. Total interest foregone over the four-
year life of the prograa, without considering the coapounding of interest, 
would be between $10.5 and $11.5 million. Including the additional interest 
that might have been earned on the foregone interest would raise the prograa's 
cost to around $12 million for four years. 
There was some additional cost of LOP: the administrative expenses of 
implementing and monitoring the project. The General Assembly authorized 
$25,000 in fiscal year 1984 and $25,000 for the biennium 1985-1986 for linked-
deposit administration. Clearly, the Treasurer's office carried out LDP with 
little additional staff and minimua additional costs. 
Likewise, the additional transaction costs at the lender level were 
probably not significant. Soae lenders groused about the additional tiae spent 
processing LDP applications, but they did not feel it involved auch additional 
expense for thea or their clients. 
Targeting of Subsidies 
If the objective of LDP was to help those faraers in fiaancial stress, 
then it is iaportant to know the stress characteristics of those who got LDP 
loans. The debt-to-asset ratio is a widely accepted measure of this stress. 
Table 1 presents the number of LOP loans in 1985 and the percentage of 
loans by debt-to-asset ratio. It can be seen that about half the loans, 755, 
were aade to borrowers in the .4 to .69 debt-to-asset category. These 
borrowers also received the majority of the funds, about $51 million. Paraers 
with a debt-to-asset ratio above .7 received about 17 percent of the value of 
loans, and made up a relatively small number of borrowers: 15 percent of the 
total, or 235 faraers. Finally, approximately 576 borrowers, 37 percent, had 
debt-to-asset ratios below .4. 
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TABLE 1: Number, Amount, and Percent of All LDP 
Loans in 1985 by Debt-To-Asset Ratio. 
Debt-To-Asset 
Ratio 
.70 and above 
.40 to .69 
below .40 
Number 
of Loans 
235 
755 
576 
15 
48 
37 
Amount 
$(000) 
16,620 
50,897 
32,032 
17 
51 
32 
Source: Compiled from unpublished LDP data 
provided by the State Treasurer's Office. 
If the number of farmers participating in LDP followed the same 
distribution as that found by the Ohio Department of Agriculture 1985 survey, 
about one-third of the LDP participants would be expected to have a debt-to-
asset ratio above .4. In fact, about two-thirds of the total number of LDP 
borrowers had debt-to-asset ratios above .4. It should be noted, however, that 
agricultural lenders in Ohio were not serving Ohio farmers who were at the ends 
of the debt-to-asset ratio distribution: those with zero debt, and those with 
large ratios who were not creditworthy. It is not clear from this information, 
therefore, whether or not lenders tilted their LDP loans toward farmers in 
their loan portfolios with the highest debt-to-asset ratios. Informal 
discussion with agricultural lenders showed no clear pattern of lender 
behavior. In 1985 some lenders recoaaended that their weakest borrowers apply 
for LDP loans, while other lenders hardly mentioned the program for fear of 
playing favorites, and only submitted applications for those who had heard 
about the program independently. A few lenders sent in LDP applications for 
all farmers who asked them to do so. Still other lenders used the LDP loans as 
a marketing device to bid away preferred borrowers from other lenders, or to 
dissuade current clients from switching to other lenders. 
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Table 2 shows the percentage of total LDP borrowers. and the percentage of 
bank and PCA borrowers to total borrowers by debt-to-asset ratio for 1985. As 
can be noted, banks had a larger percentage of borrowers in the lowest debt-
to-asset category: 45 percent versus 29 percent for the PCAs. This suggests 
that PCAs had a weaker portfolio, or that they tilted their LDP loans more in 
favor of highly leveraged farmers, than did coamercial banks. 
In 1985, linked-deposit borrowers with a debt-to-asset ratio between .4 
and .7 accounted for about 18 percent (one in six) of the approximately 4,000 
Ohio farmers with such a ratio. LDP borrowers with a ratio above .7 made up 
about 13 percent (one in eight) of the 1,800 Ohio farmers estimated to have a 
ratio above .7. Only a modest percentage of the financially stressed farmers 
in Ohio, therefore, received any relief under LDP, regardless of how one 
defines this stress. 
Effectiveness 
TABLE 2: Percentage of LDP Borrowers by 
Debt-To-Asset Ratio and Lender in 1985. 
Debt-To-Asset 
Ratio 
.70 and above 
.40 to .69 
below .40 
total 
Total Coaaercial 
Banks 
PC As 
----------Percent---------
15 14 16 
48 41 55 
37 45 29 
100 100 100 
Source: Compiled from unpublished LDP data 
provided by the State Treasurer's Office. 
The effectiveness of the subsidy involved in LDP loans in alleviating 
financial stress also depends on the size of the subsidy relative to need. An 
estimate of the amount of need is shown by the recent overall decline in farm 
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land values in Ohio, total farm debt in Ohio, total interest payments by Ohio 
farmers, and total interest payments by individual LOP borrowers. 
The market value of land provides most of the collateral for farm 
borrowing, and changes in these values sharply affect the creditworthiness of 
farmers. From 1980 to 1986 the overall value of farm land in Ohio declined $15 
billion--by about half. The 3-4 year LOP subsidy of about $12 million is less 
than 1/l,OOOth of this decline in land value. In 1984 total agricultural debt 
in Ohio was about $5 billion, 50 times the $100 million provided by LDP. 
In 1984 Ohio farmers paid approximately $200 million in interest on their 
non-real estate debt alone. This amount did not likely decline appreciably in 
1985. By way of comparison, in 1985 LDP reduced participating farmers' 
interest payments by about $3.5 million, less than 2 percent of Ohio farmers' 
interest payments on non-real estate debt in 1984 and probably less than one 
percent of their total interest payments. The $3.5 million reduction was, in 
the aggregate, certainly not enough to make a big difference to farmers on 
average. The more relevant question, though, is the difference the program 
made to the participating borrowers. To answer this question, 45 LDP borrowers 
from six representative Farm Credit System district offices were sampled to 
determine the absolute amount of interest they were paying. The magnitude of 
the LOP subsidy in relation to the total interest paid by a borrower can be 
used to determine whether or not the subsidy helped a farmer overcome financial 
difficulty. 
In Table 3 the 45 sample observations are broken down into categories by 
loan size. The average loan, largest loan, and smallest loan are given for 
each category as well as the average interest, most interest, and least 
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interest paid by sample borrowers in each category. The amount of interest 
paid is the total paid in 1985. 
It is noteworthy that most borrowers were borrowing an amount above their 
LOP request. For farmers borrowing the maximum $100,000 under LOP, the 
concessionary interest rate reduced the borrowers interest payment by about 
$2,400 in 1985 ($100,000 x .04 x 7/12). That is, the average total interest 
paid by the borrower would have been $65,300 without LOP, rather than $62,900. 
Looking at the borrower with the highest interest cost, $131,336, the interest 
payment this borrower would have made without LDP would have been about 
$133,736. The $2,400 in interest savings represented about 2 percent of the 
total interest payment for this farmer, and 23 percent of the total interest 
payment for the farmer having the lowest interest payment. 
TABLE 3: Summary Information of PCA Borrower Sample 
by Loan Size. 
LDP LOAN AMOUNT ($000): =$100 $75 to $99 < $75 
---------------------------------------------------------
NUMBER IN SAMPLE 20 11 14 
AVERAGE LDP LOAN $100,000 $83,263 $43,719 
LARGEST LOP LOAN $100,000 $90,000 $71,630 
SMALLEST LDP LOAN $100,000 $75,000 $10,000 
AVERAGE INTEREST PAID $ 62,900 $40,736 $23,551 
MOST INTEREST PAID $131,336 $67,509 $50,550 
LEAST INTEREST PAID $ 10,145 $ 8,818 $ 6,356 
----------------------------------------------------------
Source: Sample PCA data. 
The average interest paid in 1985 for borrowers of more than $75,000 and 
less than $100,000 was about $40,000. If the average loan amount in this 
category is used to calculate the benefit of the interest reduction then the 
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average borrower in this category reduced his or her interest payments by about 
$2,000 in 1985 ($83,263 X .04 X 7/12). 
The subsidy provided to these LDP borrowers was relatively small in 
relation to their total interest payments. The additional cash flow accruing 
to a farmer was negligible and unlikely to materially affect the financial 
condition of any borrower, let alone increase the viability of financially 
stressed farmers. This conclusion is supported by studies that have simulated 
interest rate reductions on the financial viability of farms and concluded that 
concessionary interest rates have a weak effect on farm viability [e.g. Barry 
(1986), and Boehlje (1985)]. 
Additionality of Funds 
At least in part, the linked-deposit program was based on the assumption 
that there was a shortage of loanable funds for farmers in Ohio. The explicit 
intent of LDP was to increase the availability of loanable funds. 
Melichar, however, points out that the average loan-to-deposit ratio of 
the nation's agricultural banks was about .56 at the end of 1985 and about .52 
at the end of 1986, the lowest level since the 1960s. (The data on Ohio banks 
is not available, but likely parallels national figures closely). On average, 
the loan-to-deposit ratios of agricultural banks have declined since the early 
1980s, meaning they have shifted their funds away from farmers. Furthermore, 
about one in seven agricultural banks currently have loan-to-deposit ratios 
below .35. Clearly, banks making agricultural loans were highly liquid in the 
mid-1980s. Similarly, the Farm Credit System has virtually unlimited access to 
national bond markets. While agricultural lenders have little trouble in 
obtaining loanable funds, they do have trouble finding creditworthy borrowers. 
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The additionality of funds can also be examined by determining if LDP 
allowed some farmers to receive loans who would otherwise not have gotten them. 
Discussions with lenders led us to conclude that virtually all LDP borrowers 
would have received the same sized loan, even without the LDP. In 1985 
virtually all of the lending institutions had already made their loan decisions 
before LDP funds became available. They simply substituted LDP funds for their 
own funds. Also, none of the lenders that we interviewed felt that the small 
subsidy provided by the concessionary interest rate on LDP loans was enough to 
make any marginal borrowers creditworthy, who would have been judged to be not 
creditworthy without the LDP subsidy. 
As a result, we conclude that LDP had little or no impact on the aggregate 
supply of loans available to farmers in Ohio and it had little, if any, effect 
on the supply of funds actually lent to LDP borrowers. 
Distributional Impact 
As mentioned earl1e~. in the 1985 cycle approximately $3.5 to $4 million 
in subsidy was transferred to LDP borrowers. Most of the concern with 
concessionary interest rates have focused on low income countries [Adams (1984) 
and Gonzalez-Vega (1977, 1984)]. These studies point out that the subsidy 
provided by concessionary interest rate programs are directly related to the 
size of the loan. Those farmers borrowing the largest amount receive the 
largest subsidy, those borrowing the smallest amount receive the smallest 
subsidy, and those who do not borrow receive no benefits. Furthermore, since 
loan size and borrowers' assets are positively correlated, the amount of the 
subsidy is a function of the borrower's wealth; thus, there is a regressive 
impact on income distribution as a result of these concessionary interest rate 
programs. 
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Information on the number of LDP loans in 1985 and the amount of credit by 
loan size is presented in Table 4. Farmers borrowing the maximum loan of 
$100,000 accounted for about one-third of the linked-deposit participants; they 
received approximately 50 percent of the program's $100 million. If the ratio 
of long-term loans and short-term loans was the same for all loan sizes, then 
those farmers borrowing the maximum loan amount received approximately 50 
percent of the total subsidy, or approximately $2 million. Those farmers 
borrowing between $50,000 and $99,000 received about 36 percent of the 
program's $100 million while accounting for about 32 percent of the borrowers. 
Those farmers borrowing below $50,000 accounted for 36 percent of the 
borrowers: they received about 14 percent of the subsidy. 
Complete information on the 1986 LDP cycle is not available. However, the 
share of loans and credit by loan size appear to have remained about the same. 
Approximately 35 percent of the 1,401 borrowers in 1986 received loans for the 
maximum $100,000 which accounted for about 50 percent of the credit. The 
remaining 65 percent of the borrowers received loans of less than $100,000 and 
received 50 percent of the credit. Again, a minority of the borrowers received 
a disproportionate share of the benefits. 
TABLE 4: Share of Number of LDP Loans 
and Value, by Loan Size, 1985. 
Loan Size 
$(000) 
= $100 
$75 - $ 99 
$50 - $ 74 
$25 - $ 49 
< $ 25 
Percent 
of Borrowers 
32 
13 
19 
20 
16 
Percent 
of Credit 
50 
18 
18 
11 
4 
Source: Compiled from unpublished data 
provided by the State Treasurer's 
Office. 
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Not only are the benefits distributed inequitably among LDP borrowers, but 
they are distributed inequitably among Ohio farmers in general. In 1985, 1,575 
farmers participated in LDP. This represents about 8 percent of Ohio's 20,000 
family-sized farms. This 8 percent received all the benefits of the program. 
The majority of Ohio farmers, who did not participate, received no benefits 
from LOP, but as taxpayers they shared in LOP's costs. 
Conclusions 
The linked-deposit program had significant pluses: (1) The General 
Assembly showed that it wanted to help agriculture. (2) In applying LOP they 
avoided other policies that could have been harmful. (3) The program was put 
in place quickly and operated with few transaction costs. And, (4) despite 
initial doubt as to how it would be accomplished, PCAs were allowed to 
participate. 
There were, however, hidden costs and unintended effects of LDP. It is 
important to keep these in mind and weigh them against the positive aspects. 
It is unlikely that Ohio voters would approve a cheap credit program for 
all farmers in Ohio, be they rich or poor, financially stressed or financially 
secure. Unfortunately, the most financially stressed farmers in Ohio were 
excluded from LOP because they were not creditworthy. Only a small portion of 
those farmers showing signs of serious financial stress, farmers with a debt-
to-asset ratio greater than .7, received LOP funds. If the objective of LOP 
was to help the most financially stressed farmers, then the LDP subsidy should 
have been more precisely targeted. 
In 1985 there were 1,331 LOP loans made to farmers with a debt-to-asset 
ratios below .7. If all LOP loans had been given to farmers with ratios above 
.7, then almost 90 percent of Ohio's 1,800 farmers with high debt-to-asset 
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ratios could have been reached. Of course, not all of these farmers could have 
been reached through commercial lenders, since many of them were not 
creditworthy and lenders assumed all lending risks. Therefore, if LDP targeted 
these high-debt farmers, it is unlikely that lenders would have been able to 
find enough creditworthy borrowers to absorb the $100 million authorized by the 
General Assembly. Commercial loans were not the way to reach those farmers 
with the most problems. 
Even if the program were more effectively targeted, the amount of 
assistance provided to borrowers is too small to materially improve their 
financial condition. Lowering the cap on the maximum size of LDP loan allowed, 
for example, would allow more farmers to participate, but the subsidies that 
now appear to be too small to make an impact would be made even smaller. If 
LDP is to be continued then the loan cap, or the interest rate reduction, might 
be increased so that the amount of help going to a targeted borrower would be 
large enough to have more impact. This would, of course, run counter to 
political objectives of having as many farmers as possible participate in LDP. 
On the other hand, if the objective of the General Assembly was to help 
Ohio agriculture in general then the $100 million was simply not enough to make 
a difference. Only about 8 percent of Ohio's 20,000 family-sized commercial 
farms participated in LDP. The total $11 to $12 million subsidy provided by 
LDP over the length of the program was small when compared to the size of the 
problems faced by Ohio's financially stressed farmers--it was less than 10 
percent of the state subsidy provided to Home State Savers. 
The explicit objective of the General Assembly was to increase the supply 
of loanable funds in Ohio agriculture. It appears, however. that there was no 
lack of loanable funds in either commercial banks or PCAs; the problem was a 
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lack of creditworthy customers. LOP made few, if any, additional farmers 
creditworthy and did not put loans into the hands of farmers who would have 
gone without otherwise. 
In addition to the above issues of targeting and additionality, the 
equitability of LDP must be questioned. The linked-deposit program was only 
large enough for a few Ohio farmers to participate. Thus, those who were not 
able to participate, and especially those who applied and were turned down, 
must wonder about the fairness of a program that excludes them, but at the same 
time provides benefits to neighbors. The most benefits flowed to those who 
borrowed the most and the fewest benefits flowed to those who borrowed the 
least. 
An alternative to LDP might be to take the subsidy out of the credit 
system and target the aid to stressed farmers through other channels. This 
would, of course, require a direct appropriation by the General Assembly and 
the explicit cost would become known to taxpayers. This information would 
allow taxpayers to make more informed decisions about the efficacy of the 
assistance program. 
Social or educational agencies could use the funds for job training for 
those being forced out of farming, to help displaced farmers relocate, to 
provide tuition for further education, or to provide counseling to financially 
stressed farmers and their fami~ies. The $12 million LDP subsidy could have 
provided about $6,000 to each of two thousand Ohio farmers suffering extreme 
financial stress or $20,000 to each of the 600 farmers estimated to have left 
farming in 1985 due to financial difficulties. 
Providing such direct assistance may be the best way to alleviate some of 
the human suffering in agriculture, if that is our intention. However, if 
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public assistance is to be channeled through the credit system, then the 
assistance must be more carefully targeted than was the LDP subsidy. On the 
other hand, if our intention is to help Ohio farmers in general, the linked-
deposit program does not appear to be the right tool. It was too small and 
reached too few farmers with too modest a subsidy to make a significant 
difference. It is also clear that financial stress in farming is a national 
problem that requires federal, not state, government action. 
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